Are L2 adversarial examples intrinsically different? by Li, Mingxuan et al.
Are L2 adversarial examples intrinsically
different?
Mingxuan Li1, Jingyuan Wang2, and Yufan Wu2
1 Brown University,
mingxuan li@brown.edu,
2 Beihang University,
{jywang, wuyufan}@buaa.edu.cn
Abstract. Deep Neural Network (DDN) has achieved notable success in
various tasks, including many security concerned scenarios. However, a
considerable amount of work has proved its vulnerability to adversaries.
We unravel the properties that can intrinsically differentiate adversar-
ial examples and normal inputs through theoretical analysis. That is,
adversarial examples generated by L2 attacks usually have larger input
sensitivity which can be used to identify them efficiently. We also found
that those generated by L∞ attacks will be different enough in the pixel
domain to be detected empirically. To verify our analysis, we proposed a
Guided Complementary Defense module (GCD) integrating detection
and recovery processes. When compared with adversarial detection meth-
ods, our detector achieves a detection AUC of over 0.98 against most of
the attacks. When comparing our guided rectifier with commonly used
adversarial training methods and other rectification methods, our recti-
fier outperforms them by a large margin. We achieve a recovered classi-
fication accuracy of up to 99% on MNIST, 89% on CIFAR-10 and 87%
on ImageNet subsets against L2 attacks. Furthermore, under the white-
box setting, our holistic defensive module shows a promising degree of
robustness. Thus, we confirm that at least L2 adversarial examples are
intrinsically different enough from normal inputs both theoretically and
empirically. And we shed lights upon designing simple yet effective de-
fensive methods with these properties.
Keywords: L2 adversarial examples, computer vision, adversarial ro-
bustness, deep learning
1 Introduction
Deep Learning has achieved great success, especially in the field of computer
vision. Multiple breakthroughs make it possible to deploy these models into real
life applications, including autonomous driving (Lin et al., 2018), face recogni-
tion (Parkhi et al., 2015), industrial automation (Meyes et al., 2017) and etc..
However, firstly pointed out by Szegedy et al. (Szegedy et al., 2013), deep neural
networks can be fooled by adding small perturbations to the inputs, which are
imperceptible to human eyes. Since then, lots of work have proved the weakness
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of deep networks, particularly under computer vision context (Akhtar and Mian,
2018). Such weakness draws attention of academia to the security aspect of deep
neural networks.
Since then, many defense methods have been proposed, including robust opti-
mization (Madry et al., 2018; Goodfellow et al., 2015), model architectures mod-
ification (Buckman et al., 2018; Dhillon et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018;
Xie et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018a), input reconstruction (Guo et al., 2018a)
and some detection based methods (Meng and Chen, 2017; Metzen et al., 2017;
Hendrycks and Gimpel, 2017; Bhagoji et al., 2017; Li and Li, 2017). Though
making seemingly promising progress against various emerging strong attacks,
these methods still have some distance to alleviating real world security con-
cerns. These steps in front include requiring large volume of computational re-
sources (Madry et al., 2018), being unresistant to white-box attacks (Carlini
and Wagner, 2017a), non-scalable nor tested in bigger datasets and sometimes
in need of modifying protected model architectures.
Inspired by the robustness analysis of a single layer neural network, we an-
swer the question whether adversarial examples are intrinsically different from
clean inputs or not. It turns out that adversarial examples generated by L2 which
we can leverage when designing detection methods. Additionally, we found em-
pirically that L∞ attacks have different properties in pixel domains.
Thus, we proposed to build a defensive module which makes use of both prop-
erties in a complementary way, called Guided Complementary Defense module,
namely, GCD. The GCD model consists of a detection and rectification pipeline.
The detection process captures adversarial examples using a gradient-domain
image sensitivity monitor and a pixel-domain image sensitivity monitor. The
rectification process recovers true predictions of perturbed images using a input
sensitivity-guided rectifier (see Fig. 1).
The experiment results over three commonly used datasets show that our
model can completely defeat several state-of-the-art attacking algorithms and
increase some attacks’ cost significantly. Though there are some preliminary
work on this topic (Dhaliwal and Shintre, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018), we are
the first to show what makes adversarial examples different theoretically and
utilize those properties to build effective defense module in a principled way.
The contribution of this paper can be concluded as:
– We find the intrinsic property analytically that can differentiate between
L2 adversarial and benign examples. To our best knowledge, we are the
first to justify the usage of gradient based detector against L2 adversarial
examples theoretically.
– The information entropy based detector ensemble in our proposed GCD
module achieves a graceful performance (about 0.98 detection AUC) on
MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet under attacks of state-of-the-art algo-
rithms, including Deepfool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), CW (Carlini
and Wagner, 2017b), DDN(champion of NIPS Adversarial Vision Challenge
2018) (Rony et al., 2019), and PGD (Madry et al., 2018).
– We propose a rectification process guided by the gradient information from
detectors to recover the true label of inputs. After rectification, we achieve a
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Fig. 1. The framework of GCD. Information entropy based detectors ensemble takes
image and gradient sensitivity of base model. If the input image is identified as ad-
versarial, a further rectification process is required. It will be patched according to
gradient sensitivity of detectors. The final prediction of GCD only comes from the
base model being protected when detector labels input as clean.
recovered classification accuracy of 99% on MNIST, 87% on CIFAR10, 83%
on ImageNet subset on average, surpassing adversarial trained model and
other rectification methods by a large margin.
– GCD does not require extra modification to the base model being protected.
This feature makes it suitable for neural network systems already deployed.
2 The Basic Idea
In this section, we will briefly introduce our motivation and the inherent idea
of our method.
Definition 1 (Classifier) We define a neural network classifier as a function
f : RM → [0, 1]L with a softmax function as its output.
Definition 2 (Adversarial Sample) For a benign input x and its predicted
label yˆ in the classifier f , we define its adversarial counterpart as (x′, yˆ′), where
‖x− x′‖2 <  and yˆ 6= yˆ′.
Definition 3 (Input Sensitivity (InSen)) With an input x and its predicted
label yˆ, we define its input sensitivity as
S(x, yˆ) =
∥∥∥∥∂L(x, yˆ)∂x
∥∥∥∥
2
, (1)
where L(·) is the cross entropy loss function of f .
Since most of the adversarial attacks use network gradient of input images
as a guide to search perturbations (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini and
Wagner, 2017b; Rony et al., 2019), the input sensitivity, which is a form of gradi-
ent, of a benign sample and its adversarial counterpart usually have a significant
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Fig. 2. A simplified example of why being close to classification boundary leads to
large input sensitivity. Top left: a toy neural network with cross entropy loss function.
It takes a two dimensional input X = (x1, x2) with label y ∈ {0, 1}; Bottom left:
The toy dataset and the extracted decision boundary (yellow line, a function of x1
and x2) from trained toy neural network. The data points are generated by adding
random noises to uniform samples of two parallel straight lines. Right: The input
sensitivity distribution of the toy neural network. The closer a data point is to the
decision boundary (yellow line), the larger its input sensitivity (z axis) will be.
difference. The basic idea of our method is using InSen as features to design
adversarial detectors. In order to prove our idea, we give following analysis.
For the sake of discussion, we decompose the classifier f into three parts:
1) The first part is a function that maps an input x into a representation
vector z, which is denoted as z = g(x).
2) The second part is a fully connected (FC) layer to calculate the prediction
indexes of each classes. For the i-th class, the FC layer calculates an index
ai = w
>
i · z.
3) The third part is a softmax function to calculate the prediction probability
of each class, which is denoted as yˆ = σ(a). For class i, this part is in the form
of
yˆi =
exp(ai)∑N
j=1 exp(aj)
, i ∈ {1, . . . , L}. (2)
In other words, the classifier f is in the form of
yˆi = fi (x) = σ (wi · g (x)) , i ∈ {1, . . . , L}. (3)
Given two classes m,n, the label of the sample x is decided by the hyperplane,
(wm −wn)> · z = 0. (4)
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Fig. 3. InSen for clean and L2 adversarial examples. Left: MNIST; Right: CIFAR-10.
There is a clear distinction between malicious inputs and clean inputs.
where z = g(x). We define a generalized distance of the sample x to the classi-
fication hyperplane as
Distz (x) =
∣∣(wm −wn)>z∣∣
‖wm −wn‖2
. (5)
For the sample x with the predicted class m, following the chain rule and after
rearranging some terms, its input sensitivity is in the form of
S(x, yˆ) =
∥∥∥∥∂L(x, yˆ)∂x
∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
p 6=m,n
C2∑
q exp (aq − ap)
+
C1
exp
(
(wm −wn)> z
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term I
+
∑
q 6=m exp (aq − an)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
(6)
where C1 =
(
∂an
∂x − ∂am∂x
)
and C2 =
(
∂ap
∂x − ∂am∂x
)
. Since the predicted label of
x is m, am > an and (wm −wn)>z > 0. Therefore, the Term I in Eq. (6) is in
direct proportion to Distz(x). In other words, the InSen S(x) of an example has
an increasing trend when its generalized distance to the classification hyperplane
decreases, i.e., Distz (x) decrease. Therefore, we get following insights:
Insight I: The samples with shorter distances to the classification hyperplane
usually have lager input sensitivities.
Insight II: For many adversarial attack methods (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016;
Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; Rony et al., 2019), the optimization object restricts
size of the perturbations (such as restricting L2 metric of perturbations). There-
fore, their adversarial examples are very likely lying close to the decision bound-
ary. Thus, their input sensitivity should be larger than normal input of that class
due to a small Distz.
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Fig. 3 illustrates the L2 norms of InSen for clean and malicious inputs from
MNIST and CIFAR-10 (setups see the experiment section). The InSen size of
clean data are very tiny, while that of the malicious data are quite gigantic. Fig. 2
is an example of toy dataset on a simple single layer neural network. For example,
take the red data point from class 0 with coordinate (−1.7,−2.1), which is quite
close to the decision boundary. From the input sensitivity distribution, we can
see clearly that it is in the most yellow area indicating a large input sensitivity.
These preliminary results confirmed our Insights.
3 Framework
Inspired by the input sensitivity property of L2 adversarial examples, we propose
the Guided Complementary Defensive module (GCD). The GCD model consists
of two components: a detector to distinguish adversarial examples from benign
examples, and a rectifier to recover adversarial examples back to its true label.
3.1 Adversarial Example Detector
Given a set of benign examples X = {x1, . . . ,xN}, a classifier to be protected,
denoted as f : RM → [0, 1]L, and an adversarial attack method, we can generate
a set of adversarial counterparts of X as X ′ = {x′1, . . . ,x′N}. Combining X and
X ′, we got a data set in the form of
X =
{
(x1, l1) , . . . , (xN , lN ) ,
(
x′1, l
′
1
)
, . . . ,
(
x′N , l
′
N
)}
, (7)
where l = (l+, l−) is a one-hot coding of benign/adversarial label. ln = (1, 0) for
benign examples and l′n = (0, 1) for adversarial examples.
The GCD model uses the data set X to train two sub-detectors.3 Firstly, we
can directly feed gradients of x from base model being protected to the detector.
As shown in Fig.3, the only thing the detector need to learn is to calculate L2
norm of the input and find a suitable divider between large input sensitivity and
normal input sensitivity, i.e.,
(p+, p−) = DETIS
(
G(x, yˆ)
)
, (8)
where G(x, yˆ) is the gradient map of sample x and p+ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability
of the input being benign, p− ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of being adversarial ones,
and p+ + p− = 1. The image label yˆ is generated by the protected base model.
However, we notice that some adversarial examples generated by L∞ attacks
may evade from our detection, this may be caused by the fact that their L2 norm
are not directly bounded and optimized. They are usually far from the classifica-
tion boundary (Yu et al., 2019) and have similar InSen as normal inputs 4. But
one weakness of not constraining L2 norm is that the adversarial examples will
be distinguishable in pixel domain. Thus, we use a second sub-detector adopts
3 See supplementary for full neural network structure of detectors.
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Removed Pixels Percent
Attack Success Rate
Deepfool CW DDN
top 0% 1.000 1.000 1.000
top 5% 0.637 0.665 0.656
top 10% 0.780 0.794 0.785
Table 1. Attack success rates of adversarial examples excluded top 5% and 10% high
saliency pixels according to detector gradients.
xn (or x
′
n) as inputs of a convolutional neural network (CNN) to predict their
benign/adversarial labels, i.e.,
(p+, p−) = DETorg
(
x
)
, (9)
Though there are preliminary work (Gong et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2018)
that has used similar detectors setup as our sub-detectors, none of them have
discovered the complementary power of these two sub-detectors empirically and
theoretically. That is to say, DETIS is suitable for detecting L2 attacks while
DETorg performs well on L∞ attacks. We further propose a information entropy
based ensemble mechanism to gain this complementary advantage.
Formally, given an input, we denote the outputs of DETorg and DETIS as
po = (p
+
o , p
−
o ) and ps = (p
+
s , p
−
s ), respectively. For the two predicted labels,
GCD estimates the information entropy they could offer as
Ho = −
[
p+o log2(p
+
o ) + p
−
o log2(p
−
o )
]
,
Hs = −
[
p+s log2(p
+
s ) + p
−
s log2(p
−
s )
]
.
(10)
The prediction from the classifier that is more confident is adopted as the final
prediction of GCD, i.e.,
(p+, p−) =
{
po if Ho < Hs
ps if Ho ≥ Hs
. (11)
The GCD model considers the images with p+ ≥ p− as benign examples, of
which the labels of the original image classification task are directly assigned by
the classifier f . On the contrary, the images with p+ < p− are considered as
adversarial examples. Their predicted label should be recovered by a rectifier.
3.2 Adversarial Example Rectifier
The design of the rectifier is inspired by the hypothesis that the gradient map of
detectors can be viewed as a form of saliency which is a clear evidence that, the
gradient map of detectors can indicate the image area being polluted. Therefore,
we conjecture if we remove the polluted pixels guided by the corresponding
detector’s saliency map, the attack might be alleviated.
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Table 1 are results of an simple experiment for verification. We use three
methods, Deepfool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), CW (Carlini and Wagner,
2017b) and DDN (Rony et al., 2019), to generate adversarial examples for a
VGG11 network, and set the pixels with top 5% and 10% biggest |∂LDET /∂xi|
as zero respectively. As shown in the table, when using original adversarial ex-
amples to attack the VGG11 network, the success rate is 100%, but when we use
adversarial examples without top 5% high saliency pixels to attack, the success
rate falls to only 63.7%. This experiment results align well with our conjecture
that gradient map from detectors can be used as indexes to pick polluted pixels
out of an adversarial input. When the ratio of removed pixels increases, the suc-
cess rate increases again as essential information needed for classification misses
too much. This requires us to design an elaborate approach to pick out the
polluted pixels.
We define an adversarial example that is detected successfully as a matrix
X, where the element xa,b is the pixel at the location (a, b)
4. If the detection
result comes from po, gradients from DETorg will be used. Otherwise, if it is
from ps, gradients from DETIS will be used. We select a pixel as a suspect when
its detector gradient is larger than a threshold,∣∣∣∣ ∂L∂xa,b
∣∣∣∣ > α · (Gmax −Gmin)+Gmin, (12)
where Gmax and Gmin are the maximum and minimum values of pixels’ sen-
sitivity in the image X, and α is a percent parameter to control the ratio of
suspect pixels.
For a suspect pixel, it will be suppressed randomly according to two random
numbers xran and uran,
xa,b :=
{
xa,b if uran = 0
xran if uran = 1
, (13)
where uran ∈ {0, 1} follows a Bernoulli distribution. If uran = 0, we keep xa,b as
its raw value, otherwise we set it as a random value xran ∈ [0, 255], xran ∈ N.
xran follows a normal distribution N(σ, µ), where σ, µ are set as the mean and
standard deviation of pixels in X.
In this way, we can generate various randomized duplicates for each adversar-
ial example Xi as a dataset Xran. Then we fine tune the original image classifier
as the rectifier frec. Compared with the original image classifier f , frec is more
robust to adversarial examples. However, its performance on benign examples is
slightly worse. To combine the advantages of both f and frec, we only use frec
to classify the adversarial examples picked out by the detector, and handle clean
inputs with f .
4 For the sake of discussion, we use the signal channel image as an example to introduce
our rectifier.
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Fig. 4. InSen for clean and L∞ adversarial examples. Left: MNIST; Right: CIFAR-10.
There isn’t any clear separation between malicious inputs and clean inputs.
4 Experiment
4.1 Experiment Setup
In the experiments, we test our GCD module on MNIST(LeCun et al., 1998),
CIFAR-10(Krizhevsky et al., 2009) and a subset of ImageNet(Deng et al., 2009).
We select images from 20 object classes with each class containing 1,040 train-
ing samples and 260 testing samples. All the pixels’ scale is in [0,1]. We use
VGG11 (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2015) as base classifier on the MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets. Our base classifiers obtain test accuracy of 99.17% and
84.41% on MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively. For ImageNet subset, we use a
pre-trained ResNet152 (He et al., 2016) with 95.25% prediction accuracy on the
test set.
Experiments are conducted on five extensively used and state of the art
attacks, which are FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015), Deepfool (DFool) (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016), PGD (Madry et al., 2018), CW (Carlini and Wagner,
2017b) and DDN (Rony et al., 2019). For each algorithm, we evaluate our model
on two types of threats, untargeted and targeted (Akhtar and Mian, 2018).
1) Untargeted Attack: For a classifier f : RM → [0, 1]L equipped with a
detector, an input image can be classified into L+1 classes, i.e., L object classes
and one adversarial class yadv. For an image with an original prediction of yˆtrue,
its untargeted adversarial counterpart is successful only when the perturbed
predicted label yˆ′ satisfies yˆ′ 6= yˆtrue and yˆ 6= yadv.
2) Targeted Attack: For an image with an original predicted label yˆtrue, its
targeted adversarial counterpart is successful only when the perturbed label yˆ′
satisfies yˆ′ = ytarget, ytarget 6= yˆtrue.
We mark the untargeted version of attack algorithms with the postfix “-U”,
and the targeted version with “-T”.5
5 FGSM and Deepfool only have untargeted version, while PGD, CW, DDN have both
targeted and untargeted versions.
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We mainly evaluate our module under two attack scenarios, white-box and
grey-box to verify our analysis that attacks guided by gradients information from
the base model are intrinsically different to be detected and recovered.
1) Grey-box Attack: The attacker has knowledge of the network parameters
and structures of the target model but is not aware of the existence of defensive
mechanisms.
2) White-box Attack: The attacker is aware that the target model is under
the protection, and has full access to the target model and the defensive module.
4.2 Performance of Detector
In this section we evaluate our detector in grey and white-box scenarios under
the metric of AUC score. All the detectors use a VGG11 unless specified. Here,
we compare the proposed detector DETGCD with six baselines:
1) DETorg uses original image as input to train a detector (Gong et al., 2017)
(see Eq. (9)).
2) DETsal uses saliency maps of network interior layers as features to train
a detector, which is first proposed by Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2018).
3) DETIS only uses input sensitivity to train a detector (see Eq. (8)).
4) DETTWS (Hu et al., 2019) utilizes two seemingly paradoxical criteria
of benign images to detect adversarial examples, with the assumption that an
adversarial example cannot satisfy both two criteria.
5) DETPD (Song et al., 2018b) utilizes a PixelCNN network to extract fea-
tures of examples, and adopts a test statistic to decide whether an input is an
adversarial example.
6) DETMDS (Lee et al., 2018) utilizes Mahalanobis Distance-based Score to
measure different distributions of adversarial and benign examples in a networks
interior-layers’ outputs.
The Grey-box Attacks For grey-box attacks, the attacker has full access
to base classifiers’ structures and parameters, but the attacker does not know
the existence of our detector. Adversarial examples are not optimized for the
detector. This is a favorable condition for our detector, since the enemies are
exposed and we are in a shelter. Tab. 2 shows AUC score of grey-box attacks.
As shown in the table, we observe that:
1) The DETGCD achieves above 98% AUC for all datasets and all attacks.
2) On harder datasets CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, DETIS only shows good
performance under L2 attacks, which verifies Insight I we proposed in Sec. 2.
3) For FGSM and PGD attacks, the performance of DETorg is better than
DETIS . As we claimed in 3.1, the reason lies behind is they are not bounded by
L2 norm, while they are easily detected by DETorg as the pixel space distortion
is big enough.
4) DETGCD benefits from both DETIS and DETorg using Eq. (11) and
achieves the best average performance (estimated by Win Count), which is close
to the better one between DETIS and DETorg for most of the time.
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Dataset Attacker F DETorg DETsal DETIS DETPD DETTWS DETMDS Our
M
N
IS
T
FGSM-U 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.73 0.81 1.00
PGD-U 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.75 0.89 1.00
PGD-T 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.93 0.90 1.00
DFool-U 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.87 1.00
CW-U 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.95 0.89 1.00
CW-T 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.93 1.00
DDN-U 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.89 1.00
DDN-T 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
FGSM-U 0.19 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.52 0.83 1.00
PGD-U 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.99 0.52 0.76 1.00
PGD-T 0.18 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.99 0.58 0.71 1.00
DFool-U 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.98 0.77 0.83 0.93 0.98
CW-U 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.98 0.78 0.90 0.93 0.98
CW-T 0.00 0.51 0.51 0.98 0.84 0.94 0.94 0.98
DDN-U 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.99 0.70 0.91 0.93 0.99
DDN-T 0.00 0.51 0.53 0.99 0.81 0.96 0.94 0.99
Im
a
g
eN
et
FGSM-U 0.27 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.54 0.80 0.99
PGD-U 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.98 0.54 0.79 1.00
PGD-T 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.98 0.60 0.75 1.00
DFool-U 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.99 0.80 0.79 0.91 0.99
CW-U 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.98 0.82 0.86 0.90 0.98
CW-T 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.98 0.79 0.90 0.91 0.98
DDN-U 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.71 0.91 0.93 1.00
DDN-T 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.84 0.91 0.94 1.00
Table 2. Summary of the detectors performance (AUC score) in grey-box scenario. F
stands for base model accuracy under attacks.
5) DETGCD outperforms all three recent state-of-the-art detectors by a large
margin.
The White-box Attacks In this scenario, attackers have full knowledge of
our defensive model and they can generate adversarial examples accordingly.
We evaluate our model under targeted and untargeted attacks. For targeted
attacks, we use the method proposed by Carlini&Wagner (Carlini and Wagner,
2017a), which treats our GCD model as a L+ 1 classifier, i.e., L natural classes
and an adversarial class. For the untargeted attacks, we optimize a combined
cross entropy loss function to evade our proposed defense,
Lcom = Ladv + βLGCD (14)
where Lcom is the combined cross entropy loss, Ladv is the loss for image label,
LGCD is the loss for our detector and β is a constant to balance the weight of
detector loss in the combined object. See details in supplementary.
As suggested by Carlini and Wagner (Carlini and Wagner, 2017a), a success-
ful white-box attack should not be detected by the detector as well as fooling
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Attacker
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
NoDET DETIS Our NoDET DETIS Our NoDET DETIS Our
FGSM-U 0.271 0.012 0.000 0.315 0.009 0.000 0.608 0.566 0.180
PGD-U 1.000 0.871 0.263 0.945 0.805 0.143 1.000 0.359 0.425
PGD-T 1.000 1.000 0.437 0.957 0.734 0.463 1.000 0.456 0.485
DFool-U 1.000 0.828 0.286 1.000 0.738 0.394 0.995 0.087 0.087
CW-U 1.000 0.000 0.008 1.000 0.009 0.023 1.000 0.009 0.023
CW-T 1.000 0.180 0.471 1.000 0.556 0.321 0.995 0.056 0.015
DDN-U 1.000 0.004 0.941 1.000 0.019 0.014 1.000 0.159 0.092
DDN-T 1.000 0.808 0.392 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.338 0.326
Table 3. Attack success rate under white-box attacks. Smaller is better.
Attacker DDN-U DDN-T
Without detector 0.787 0.45
With Our DETGCD 10.252 0.618
Table 4. The L2 perturbations of the three “failed” attacks. It is clear that the pertur-
bation required for attacking protected models is larger than that for vanilla models.
the base classifier. The adversarial examples that cannot bypass the detector or
fail to fool the classifier are not successful.
Therefore, the AUC score of binary classification is no longer suitable for
evaluating the worst case performance of our detector. Instead, we use success
rate of adversarial examples to evaluate performance of our detectors. We con-
sider an attacker fails when its attack success rates is less than 50%. From Tab. 3,
we can see that,
1) Even in the worst case, our model GCD can still successfully defeat FGSM,
PGD, and CW.
2) Our model achieves full success on ImageNet subset. The defense fails
when it is tested against untargeted DDN on MNIST and targeted DDN on
CIFAR-10. We highlighted these failed defenses in blue for further analysis.
However, does our defense really fail? We need to open the box to look
into some details. Tab. 4 shows the L2 perturbations of these three “failed”
cases. Obviously, these attacks evade our defense to some extent at the cost
of significantly increased L2 perturbations. Fig. 5 also gives example perturbed
images from these three attacks. The noise can be observed easily. Therefore, we
cannot say these samples are truly “successful”.
Besides, for targeted DDN, of which the L2 perturbations is pretty small, we
still cannot say the attack is “success” due to huge computing resource consump-
tion. In our experiments, it spends about 40 hours to train the targeted DDN
attacker over 10,000 CIFAR10 dataset. However, it only takes one hour to train
DDN on a vanilla classifier without protection. We believe the time consumption
will become unacceptable for training DDN attacker that can fool GCD when
it comes to a huge real-world image dataset.
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(a) Untargeted DDN for MNIST
(b) Targeted DDN for CIFAR-10
Fig. 5. Example perturbed images from “failed” cases. The resulted outputs are highly
noisy, which is another indicator that our method does increase the attacking cost even
being bypassed. First row in each sub-figure is clean and the second row is perturbed.
4.3 Performance of Rectifier
Next, we test the performance of the rectifier. The implementation of the rectifier
includes two steps: 1) generating images with detector gradients guided random
mask; 2) using the masked images to fine tune classifier. These two steps both
contribute to the rectifier’s performance improvement. Therefore, we conduct
analysis on these two steps respectively.
Fig. 6. Influence of different masking rate on the rectifier’s performance. Left: Targeted.
Right: Untargeted.
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MNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet
Our PD DDN PGD TVM F Our PD DDN PGD TVM F Our PD DDN PGD TVM F
Clean 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.84 0.67 0.92 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.64 0.35 0.86 0.86 0.66 0.78 0.72 0.75 0.95
FGSM-U 0.85 0.75 0.82 0.82 0.49 0.56 0.64 0.36 0.55 0.43 0.29 0.24 0.67 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.36 0.44
PGD-U 0.84 0.64 0.80 0.81 0.57 0.27 0.77 0.30 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.08 0.77 0.70 0.38 0.47 0.66 0.02
PGD-T 0.89 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.53 0.66 0.74 0.62 0.33 0.48 0.32 0.05 0.77 0.66 0.29 0.51 0.73 0.00
DFool-U 0.90 0.88 0.26 0.76 0.65 0.00 0.74 0.71 0.19 0.29 0.34 0.00 0.82 0.58 0.37 0.35 0.75 0.01
CW-U 0.90 0.88 0.70 0.73 0.66 0.00 0.75 0.73 0.70 0.63 0.34 0.00 0.80 0.64 0.50 0.53 0.74 0.00
CW-T 0.89 0.86 0.72 0.53 0.65 0.00 0.74 0.75 0.45 0.46 0.33 0.00 0.73 0.61 0.40 0.39 0.75 0.00
DDN-U 0.90 0.89 0.74 0.76 0.66 0.00 0.75 0.74 0.66 0.52 0.34 0.00 0.83 0.60 0.56 0.44 0.75 0.03
DDN-T 0.90 0.89 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.53 0.43 0.34 0.00 0.80 0.60 0.50 0.39 0.74 0.00
Table 5. Classification Accuracy of our GCD module. F stands for the base model
being protected. PGD and DDN are two adversarial trained baselines. TVM stands for
Total Variance Minimization and PD stands for PixelDefend, which are two famous
rectification methods.
We first evaluate how different masking rate influences the performance of
InSen guided rectification. Fig. 6 shows the rectifier performance on adversarial
examples of our ImageNet subset. We vary the parameter α, which controls the
masking rate, in Eq. (12) from 10% to 90%. Obviously, neither too large nor too
small α is a good choice. Too small α cannot eliminate the influence of adversarial
perturbations; too large α may cause loss of too much image information. In
untargeted scene, we use 0.55 for MNIST, 0.65 for CIFAR-10, 0.45 for ImageNet
subset. In targeted scene, we use 0.6 for MNIST, 0.7 for CIFAR-10, 0.35 for
ImageNet subset.
Secondly, we mask adversarial examples and uses the masked examples to
fine tune the base classifier as a rectifier. Tab. 5 lists the adversarial example
classification performance of the rectifiers for different datasets. As shown by
the table, our recovery accuracy for the adversarial examples surpass all the
baselines including those adversarial trained models (PGD, DDN)(Madry et al.,
2018; Rony et al., 2019) and some famous rectification method (PD, TVM)(Song
et al., 2018b; Guo et al., 2018b).
It is worthy of mentioning that,
1) Here we train our PGD adversarial classifier using the same parameters
reported in (Madry et al., 2018) on MNIST, CIFAR-10. Their adversarial trained
Wide ResNet/simple ResNet can only achieve around 45% accuracy on CIFAR-
10, while our VGG11 classifier could achieve more than 74%. The situation
is same for MNIST. This also dampens their claim on the influence of model
capacity to the robustness.
2) Our VGG11 achieves 99% and 88% on MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively,
while adversarial trained VGG11 using DDN (Rony et al., 2019) only achieves
87% and 67%.
3) On ImageNet subset, our rectifier using wide ResNet shows significant
superiority over other baselines.
5 Related Work
Previous research on finding adversarial examples assume attackers have full
access to the models called “white box” attacks. Many widely applied attacks
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leverage gradient of the model to guide their search towards efficient perturba-
tions (Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; Kurakin et al., 2017a; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Su et al., 2019; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Rony et al., 2019; Madry et al.,
2018). In a more realistic setting, direct access to the target model is not always
available to attackers. Thus, subsequent work also focuses on “black box” at-
tacks (Papernot et al., 2016a, 2017; Alzantot et al., 2019; Guo et al., 2019). From
an optimization perspective, to search for a suitable adversarial perturbation is
to solve a certain object function with constrained noise payload under some
measures like L0, L2, L∞.
The methods proposed to mitigate the threats of adversaries could mainly
be divided into two categories. One is to make robust predictions against ad-
versaries directly. This could be done in various approaches including robust
optimization, model architecture modification and inference time reconstruction
of inputs. 1) Robust optimization (Madry et al., 2018; Goodfellow et al., 2015)
mainly augments the training data by adding adversarial examples to train a
robust classifier. It usually requires online update of training data consuming ex-
orbitant time and computational resources which makes it difficult at ImageNet
scale (Kurakin et al., 2017b). 2) Modifying model architectures (Buckman et al.,
2018; Dhillon et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018; Song et al.,
2018a) typically means manipulating the model gradients to make it intractable
at inference time for adversarial attacks or use sub networks like defensive dis-
tillation (Papernot et al., 2016b). These methods have also been proved to be
ineffective (Athalye et al., 2018; Carlini and Wagner, 2016). 3) Reconstruction
of inputs (Guo et al., 2018a) during inference time could remove input perturba-
tions to some extent so that the input could be classified correctly. This method
could also be bypassed with BPDA (Athalye et al., 2018) which approximates
the gradient of the target network.
Considering the hardness of counteracting attacks directly, another main
stream of method focuses on the detection of adversarial examples. Approaches
include using auxiliary neural networks (Meng and Chen, 2017; Metzen et al.,
2017) to decide if input is clean or adversarial, using statistical methods to
verify properties of the image or the network parameters (Metzen et al., 2017;
Hendrycks and Gimpel, 2017; Bhagoji et al., 2017; Li and Li, 2017). However,
Carlini and Wagner proved that under calibrated attacks these methods are still
ineffective (Carlini and Wagner, 2017a,c).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we discovered the properties called input sensitivity that can truly
discriminate L2 adversarial examples from normal inputs through theoretical
analysis. We further investigate the input sensitivity of L∞ attacks empirically.
Based on those findings, we proposed a Guided Complementary Defense module
(GCD) integrating detection and recovery processes to verify our analysis. Our
detector achieves a detection rate of over 95% against most of the attacks. Our
rectifier achieves a recovered classification accuracy of up to 99% on MNIST, 89%
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on CIFAR-10 and 87% on ImageNet subsets. In conclusion, we are certain that
at least L2 adversarial examples are intrinsically different from normal inputs
and shed light on using this theoretically sound property to design simple yet
effective defense mechanisms.
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